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Patterns of OFDI: Comparing Japan’s and China’s Emergence on
the Global Scene 1
YAONING WU
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology
KEVIN CHRIST
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
This paper compares patterns of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI)
for Japan and China over similar periods of their integration into the
global economy. From a statistical perspective, China’s recent pattern of
OFDI flows (2004–2010) differs from Japan’s OFDI flows during a
similar period of growth and emergence onto the world scene (1976–
1982). While acknowledging that the world economy is a much different
place today than it was in 1982, we nevertheless argue that these
differences in OFDI flows constitute an important component in any
understanding of the nature of development followed by these two
important Asian economies.
KEY WORDS China; Japan; OFDI

The three and one-half decades from 1976 to 2010 witnessed the emergence of
two important Asian economies—Japan and China—onto the world scene in distinct
episodes. During roughly the first half of this period, Japan’s gross domestic product as a
percentage of world gross domestic product grew from about 10 percent to 18 percent.
During the second half of the period, China’s aggregate output similarly grew in
international importance—from only about 2 percent of world GDP to almost 10 percent.
There are both similarities and difference in these two cases; this paper focuses on one
area specifically—outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). A full understanding of
OFDI flows is important to any discussion about the paths of development followed by
these two important Asian economies.
We focus specifically on two seven-year periods: 1976–1982 for Japan and 2004–
2010 for China. Although in some sense the choice of coverage periods may seem
somewhat arbitrary, examination of the overall growth trajectories of Japan and China
seems to make these periods comparable in the sense that it was during these periods that
1
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Japan and China became important global trading partners and began to account for
significant portions of world output. Thus, we contend that these periods represent similar
points in the trajectories of these two economies as their relative importance to the world
economy grew. Furthermore, a simple comparative analysis using a gravity model
indicates that the nature of their OFDI was different during these periods of significant
growth.
As a preliminary review, Tables 1 and 2 compare patterns of OFDI flows by
geographic region for Japan and China over the two relevant time periods. Three features
stand out. First, China’s OFDI to Hong Kong dominates its overall OFDI during this
period. Second, Japan’s growth in OFDI progressed at a steadier rate than did China’s,
which exhibits a notable jump from 2006 to 2007. Third, there are clear differences in the
geographic distributon of these two countries’ OFDI over these periods. For example,
Japan’s flows to North America between 1976 and 1982 were a far more important
component of its OFDI (ranging from 24.9 percent to 41.1 percent) than were China’s
between 2004 and 2010 (ranging from 3.7 percent to 15.4 percent of its non-Hong Kong
OFDI).1 Futhermore, almost 36 percent of China’s OFDI between 2004 and 2010 went to
Africa and Oceana, while for Japan between 1976 and 1982, the comparable figure was
about 12 percent. Of course, this difference could be due, in part, to the increasing
relative importance of these areas to the global economy since the 1980s. Nevertheless,
such differences raise interesting questions about the nature and causes of OFDI for these
two economies during similar periods of emergence onto the global scene.
Literature Review
Studies of Japanese OFDI during the subject time period have tended to focus on
political and institutional features of foreign investment and on the facilitation of exports
to existing markets (Lee 1999; Mason 1992; Randerson and Dent 1996; Tuman and
Emmert 1999). Similarly, studies of recent Chinese OFDI have also focused on political
and institutional factors but additionally have tended to note the role of resource
procurement in driving such investment (Gonzalez-Vincente 2012; Kolstad and Wiig
2011). Such studies are important for a full understanding of the forces that drive
outward investment and determination of the patterns of those flows.
Because China is a developing country that has historically and generally been
short of capital and foreign exchange, its OFDI deserves some explanation. China’s
OFDI seems to have been biased towards tax havens and Southeast Asian countries and
has been mostly conducted by state-controlled enterprises (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao
2007). Such a characterization distinguishes China’s OFDI from Japan’s early OFDI
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, which seems to have been conducted mainly by
private multinational enterprises (MNEs), making Japanese MNEs similar in many
respects to U.S. MNEs (Lipsey, Ramstetter, and Blomstrom 2000). For Japan, OFDI
seems to have been driven by the need to control costs and exchange rate risk in existing
export markets. Thus, while Japan’s OFDI grew considerably after Japan had already
become an important exporter of high-end manufactured goods, China burst onto the
world trading scene and saw its OFDI begin to rise rapidly while still a low-cost production
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base, so it is possible that cost minimization has not been a major motivation behind
China’s OFDI. Because China closely manages its exchange rate, controlling exchange
rate risk also would not seem to be an important consideration in understanding its OFDI.
Other possible influences on China’s OFDI include support of market expansion;
securement of sources for inputs, including natural resources; technological and brand
asset seeking; and furtherance of government objectives. Early thinking on the subject
focused on the first two of these factors (McDermott and Huang 1996; Zhan 1993,
1995;).The literature on Chinese OFDI has focused on at least four factors that might
help explain China’s pattern of OFDI:
Market expansion. According to the analysis from UNCTAD (2003, 2007),
Chinese firms that export are investing abroad to support their exports, service their
markets through OFDI, or expand their market presence. In international markets that
China has considerable trade surpluses with (e.g., the United States), OFDI may
increasingly become an alternative vehicle to supply those markets. As part of such a
strategy, Chinese firms are also buying local distribution networks. Moreover, as
UNCTAD also pointed out, sluggish domestic demand in China and excess industrial
productive capacity since the late 1990s in certain industries (especially in machinery and
electronic appliances) have encouraged Chinese firms to look for growth opportunities
abroad .
Natural resources. As China is a developing country with an average annual GDP
growth rate of approximately 10 percent, it requires a large amount of natural resources
to maintain the fast pace of growth. The need for dependable access to natural resources
abroad has become stronger, which has encouraged Chinese firms to invest in oil, gas,
and mining activities in resource-rich countries. The 2007 UNCTAD report, for example,
stated that China is one of the major capital providers for developing countries in Africa.
China’s acquisitions of operations in the area of natural resources have drawn
considerable attention from the media and politicians.
Overseas technological and brand assets seeking. Part of China’s OFDI that is
made by Chinese MNEs has flown into developed countries, and its absolute value keeps
rising. The motives for such investment include access to technology and other strategic
assets such as brand names, as well as access to different markets. The aspiration to go
abroad to build or acquire international brand assets and advance product development
has also become a major factor in multinational operations. With growing financial
reserves, Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) have gone on a buying spree
abroad to acquire assets whose prices may have been depressed by the current global
economic downturn. Related examples are acquisitions made by companies such as
Lenovo and TCL, which have been mentioned in the previous section.
Governmental encouragement policies. The government has encouraged Chinese
firms to invest abroad to secure the supply of resources to meet the growing demand at
home and to transfer matured technologies in which Chinese firms have a comparative
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advantage (e.g., electronics and textile- and garment-processing industries). The Chinese
government has also supported small- and medium-sized Chinese enterprises as they
expanded into international markets. Provincial administrations such as those in
Guangdong and Shanghai have also actively encouraged their domestic enterprises to
invest abroad. The Ministry of Commerce has already implemented policy measures,
including a relaxed approval system for outward FDI. As of December 2002, China had
signed bilateral investment treaties with 103 countries and double-taxation treaties with
68 countries to facilitate its OFDI abroad. The Export-Import Bank of China, through its
financing facilities, has also played an important role in supporting Chinese outward
investment. Other measures to encourage Chinese firms to invest abroad include easier
access to loans from commercial banks, foreign exchange-rate manipulation, and
preferential policies such as corporate income tax exemption (UNCTAD 2003, 2007).
In this study, we are simply interested in seeing if hypothesized differences in
motivation and conduct of OFDI might manifest themselves as differences in the
coefficients of a simple gravity model. Such models have been used for years to analyze
the nature of bilateral trade flows. Since the introduction of the gravity model into
discussions of international trade (Linnemann 1966; Tinbergen 1962), the model has been
employed mostly to investigate the importance of size and distance on the determination
of trade flows (Feenstra 2004, ch. 5; Helpman 1987; Isard 1990). Wider application of
gravity models to topics such as foreign direct investment is a rather recent innovation.
Our empirical approach here is to apply a simple version of the gravity model and see if
the results are consistent with hypothesized differences discussed in previous literature.
Methodology and Data
To further investigate the nature of possible differences in the patterns of OFDI
flows, we fit the two countries’ respective OFDI data to a gravity model, simplifying an
approach employed in previous research on related subjects (Cheng and Ma 2007). In
traditional use, a gravity model analysis posits that bilateral trade flows between two
countries, i and j; Fi,j are based on the economic sizes of—Mi and Mj, measured as GDP
values—and distance between—Di,j—the two economies (Head 2003). The functional
relationship takes the form:

When expressed in natural logs, this relationship takes the form:
lnFij = C + lnMi + lnMj – lnDij

where the constant term, C, replaces lnG. In our analysis, one of the economies in the
model is always either Japan or China; hence, we exclude Mi from the model when
estimating parameters. Looking solely at China’s OFDI, Cheng and Ma (2007) fitted a
similar regression based on the gravity model:
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where FDIit stands for China’s FDI flow to (or FDI stock in) economy i in year t, GDPit
and PGDPit stand for the host economy’s real GDP and per capita real GDP, respectively;
disti stands for the distance between the economy’s capital and Beijing, ChineseLangi is a
dummy variable for the use of the Chinese language, Borderi stands for its sharing a
common border with China, Landlocki indicates that it is a landlocked economy, and
Islandi indicates that it is an island economy. Because our research interest is solely in
economic mass and distance as potential explanatory variables, and because of the low
explanatory power of the other variables in Cheng and Ma’s paper, we estimate a
parsimonious version of this model that includes only GDP and distance as explanatory
variables.
Preliminary analysis using Cheng and Ma’s more detailed model indicated that
the additional variables on language, borders, and ocean access added little explanatory
value to the basic model, so we fit our data to a parsimonious version of a gravity model,
with only the distance between the two countries and the partner county’s GDP as righthand variables. We employed two estimation strategies: period fixed effects and period
fixed effects with random cross-section effects.2
1. The first specification, with fixed effects in period and no effects in crosssections, involves estimation of the following equation:

where τt is the dummy variable for fixed effects in period (LSDV model).
2. The second specification, with fixed effects in period and random effects in
cross-sections, involves estimation of the following equation:

wi,t = vi + µ i,t, where vi ~ IID(0, σv2) and µ i,t ~ IID(0, σm2). In this specification, the vi are
assumed to be independent of µi,t and log(GDPi,t), which are also independent of each
other for all i and t. The components of Cov(wi,t, wj,s) = E(wi,t, wj,s) are σv2 + σµ2, if i = j
and t = s, and σv2, if i = j and s≠t.
Data on Chinese OFDI are from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and include
annual observations for 81 countries from 2004 to 2010. China’s Ministry of Commerce
provides the most detailed information about China’s outward FDI flows/stock by region
and by sectors. The source data included observations from 165 host economies in the
sample for OFDI flows. Missing observations resulted in the reduced sample size. In
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Tables 1 and 2, we show data for 81 countries that collectively accounted for about 85
percent of China’s OFDI over the period of study.
Data on Japanese OFDI are from the Ministry of Trade and include annual
observations for 75 countries from 1976 to 1982. During the period under study, these 75
countries accounted for well over 90 percent of Japan’s OFDI.
Results and Discussion
Tables 3 and 4 present regression results. Turning first to the estimation results on
Chinese OFDI data, it seems reasonable to conclude that the host economy’s GDP is
positively related to OFDI, while the distance between China and the economy exerts a
negative impact on attracting China’s OFDI. These results correspond to a priori
expectations of a gravity model. Although the overall explanatory value of the model, as
measured by the R2 (0.2933 in Model 1 and 0.3602 in Model 2, respectively) seems low,
it is somewhat higher than similar estimation results in Cheng and Ma (0.2816 in their
Table 3). Furthermore, the parameters are estimated with a high degree of precision, with
all of the estimators statistically significant at 1 percent level of confidence.

Table 3a. Regression Results of Gravity Model Analysis on China’s OFDI Flows
(2004–2010)
Model 1. Period: F.E.
Cross-Section: None
9.700688**
(1.220172)

Model 2. Period: F.E.
Cross-Section: R.E.
9.565575**
(2.543426)

(log(GDP))

0.286700**
(0.040526)

0.312589**
(0.083351)

(log(Distance))

–0.939064**
(0.135225)

–0.936693**
(0.282592)

R2

0.293281

0.360191

Hauseman Test
p-value

Period: N.A.
Cross-Section: N.A.

Period: N.A.
Cross-Section:
0.0680

Likelihood Ratio Test
p-value

Period: 0.0000
Cross-Section: N.A.

Period: 0.0000
Cross-Section: N.A.

Estimators
Constant

Note: ** and * indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively; standard
deviations are provided in parentheses.
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Table 3b. Regression Results of Gravity Model Analysis on China’s OFDI Flows
(2004–2010)—Excluding Hong Kong
Model 1. Period: F.E.
Cross-Section: None
7.5824**
(1.198)

Model 2. Period: F.E.
Cross-Section: R.E.
7.4723**
(2.4098)

(log(GDP))

0.2740**
(0.0388)

0.2964**
(0.0772)

(log(Distance))

–0.7019**
(0.1329)

–0.7006**
(0.2678)

R2

0.2857

0.3550

Hauseman Test
p-value

Period: N.A.
Cross-Section: N.A.

Period: N.A.
Cross-Section: 0.0555

Likelihood Ratio Test
p-value

Period: 0.0000
Cross-Section: N.A.

Period: 0.0000
Cross-Section: N.A.

Estimators
Constant

Note: ** and * indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively; standard
deviations are provided in parentheses.

Turning next to the estimation results on Japan’s OFDI, the results seem to
indicate that Japan’s OFDI flows during the relevant period were much more dependent
on the size and distance of a partner economy. This is consistent with the data in Tables 1
and 2 that show that larger percentages of Japan’s OFDI were to North America and
Europe. The parameters do have the expected signs and are estimated with a high degree
of precision.
Table 4. Regression Results of Gravity Model Analysis on Japan’s OFDI Flows
(1976–1982)
Model 1. Period: F.E.
Cross-Section: None
8.711058**
(2.548435)

Model 2. Period:F.E.
Cross-Section: R.E.
8.929845
(5.426621)

(log(GDP))

0.621678**
(0.079362)

0.595676**
(0.166264)

(log(Distance))

–1.079670**
(0.288469)

–1.095947
(0.615724)
0.084309

Estimators
Constant

R2

0.179522

Note: ** and * indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively; standard
deviations are provided in parentheses.
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Table 5 presents a two-sample test of means to testing the hypothesis that the
estimators from Japan’s and China’s regression models are statistically equal. According
to the decision rules shown in the table, we rejected the null hypothesis on all the
estimators. Thus these tests are consistent with a view that China’s recent pattern of
OFDI flows differs considerably from Japan’s period of export-oriented growth. Both
the size and distance parameters are larger for Japan. This could be an artifact of Japan’s
heavy OFDI to the United States. Such results are also consistent with observations that
China’s OFDI has been biased, in part, toward nearby southeast Asian countries (Morck,
et al, 2007). Generally, we believe the results provide further empirical evidence that
China’s approach to OFDI has been qualitatively different from the Japan’s approach in
the 1970s and early 1980s.
Thus, from a statistical perspective, China’s recent pattern of OFDI flows seems
different from a period of Japan’s export-oriented growth that in other respects looks
comparable. This observation is consistent with previous speculation in the literature that
China’s OFDI may be driven by considerations different from those that were behind
Japan’s OFDI during a similar period of economic expansion. Drawing on this literature,
our results may be attributable to several factors underlying China’s OFDI. We recount
some of those factors here.
Table 5. Two-Sample Test of Means on Regression Results from China’s and
Japan’s Gravity Model Analysis
Estimators

z-score

Constant

–3.2910

Decision Rule
(5% significance level)
Reject H0

(log(GDP))

–32.3618

Reject H0

(log(Distance))

9.7619

Reject H0

Notes: Based on comparison of parameter estimates in Tables 3b and 4.
Null hypothesis: H0:
Alternative hypothesis: HA:
Source: Mansfield 1983:305–308

First, unlike Japan, China doesn’t have a fully opened economy because of its
capital-control policy, and this may have imposed restrictions on the direction and
amount of outward investment. Besides, Japan’s manufacturing sector (e.g., autos,
electronics) accounted for a large portion of its OFDI during the period. One
interpretation of this phase of Japan’s development might focus on the fact that Japan’s
labor costs during the 1980s were already quite high relative to those of its export
partners. Japan, unlike China, was not a low-cost production base; hence, China focused
its investment more on other sectors such as business services and banking because it did
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not need to diversify its manufacturing base internationally as labor cost advantages
disappeared.
Moreover, other reasons such as cultural and political issues may have also
affected the patterns of OFDI growth of these two countries. Since 1979, the government
has encouraged Chinese firms to invest abroad, as part of its “Open Policy.” This type of
outward investment was viewed as an important means of securing the supply of
resources to meet the growing demand at home, strengthening economic relations with
neighboring countries, and transferring matured technologies in which Chinese firms
have a comparative advantage (e.g., electronics and textile- and garment-processing
industries). The Chinese government has also supported small- and medium-sized
Chinese enterprises as they expanded into international markets. Provincial
administrations such as those in Guangdong and Shanghai have also actively encouraged
their domestic enterprises to invest abroad. The Ministry of Commerce has already
implemented policy measures, including a relaxed approval system for outward FDI
(UNCTAD 2003, 2007). On top of this, to prevent excessive capital outflows at the
expense of domestic investment, the Chinese government has taken actions controlling
the direction of OFDI. For instance, as Zhan stated, the government “favored investments
in kind (equipment, know-how and raw materials) to avoid excessive capital outflows.”
The government also encouraged resource and market-seeking OFDI, as they would
generate benefits for the domestic economy (Zhan 1995:3). Unlike how that China’s
outward investment has always been part of the government’s development scenario,
Japan’s OFDI growth was primarily driven by the independent wills of each
multinational company, a factor that might account for some of the differences in the
OFDI patterns of the two countries, as these multinationals already had large market
shares in established industrialized economies.
As we also mentioned in the introduction, Japan’s flows to North America
between 1976 and 1982 were a huge component of its OFDI, while China’s OFDI mainly
flowed into Hong Kong during recent years. As for Japan, we speculate (as have others)
that this pattern of OFDI emerged in response to rising calls in its exporting markets to
raise barriers to imports from Japan. For Japan, OFDI was a means of forestalling an
outright protectionist response to its exports. In China’s case, the government promoted
FDI in Hong Kong out of a belief that these investments would build confidence in the
economic future of Hong Kong (Zhan 1995:4). Besides, the large Chinese MNCs (often
state-controlled) favor investing in Hong Kong, as it can serve as a springboard for
further investment abroad with its geographical proximity and easy trading policy.
Conclusion
To summarize, for an important period in China’s economic development, its
pattern of OFDI exhibited interesting differences from Japan’s pattern of OFDI over a
similar period. In this respect, the two countries’ emergences on the global scene were
notably different, and these differences shed light on the patterns of development
followed by these two important Asian economies. Overall, one might expect that
China’s OFDI will continue to grow in the future, and it’s possible that China’s pattern of
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OFDI flows will take on features more like those of Japan’s period of export-oriented
growth as liberalization of capital movements continues and as labor cost differentials
between China and its trading partners diminish.
We believe that our investigations here are generally consistent with a view that
China’s pattern of OFDI differs in many respects from Japan’s pattern of OFDI during
what may be characterized as its emergence on the global scene. Certainly, access to
foreign markets is one explanatory factor, but ensuring a stable supply of resources
(McDermott and Huang 1996; Zhan 1995) and geopolitical factors (Wang 2002) may
also play a more important role than was the case for Japan. We believe that our
investigations and analysis here are consistent with these views, provide an additional
basis for understanding a key dimension of China’s economic development, and perhaps
may aid in understanding probable future features of that development.
ENDNOTES
1. The data also show that a larger proportion of China’s OFDI to North America went
to Canada, compared to Japan’s over the relevant period, whose North American
OFDI was dominated by OFDI to the United States.
2. In selection of estimation strategies, we employed a Hauseman Test (which tests the
validity of the assumption of random effects), and Redundant Fixed Effects–
Likelihood Ratio Test (which tests the validity of the assumption of fixed effects).
Two conclusions led to our use of the estimation strategies reported here:
1. The p-value of the null hypothesis of fixed effects in period being redundant was
0.0000, so we reject the null at 1 percent level; therefore, the assumption of period
fixed effects seems valid.
2. The p-value of the null hypothesis of the existence of random effects in crosssection was 0.068, so we can only reject the null at 10 percent level. As a result, there
may be some random effects in cross-sections.
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